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O
n February 4, 2005, military guards welcomed 
guests arriving at the Livadia Palace near Yalta, 
as they had done sixty years earlier on the first 
day of the Yalta Conference, which brought together 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph 
Stalin to discuss the shape of the world after the Second 
World War. Aside from the honor guard and the return 
to the Livadia Palace of some of the former Soviet sol-
diers and waitresses who had provided security for the 
conference and helped assure its smooth progress sixty 
years earlier, there was little resemblance between the 
events of February 1945 and those of 2005. The organiz-
ers of the 2005 Yalta conference—a symposium entitled 
“Yalta 1945-2005: From the Bipolar World to the Geo-
politics of the Future”—anxiously awaited but never 
received greetings from President Viktor Yushchenko 
of Ukraine, to which Yalta and the Crimea now belong, 
or from President Vladimir Putin of Russia—the legal 
successor to the Soviet Union, which hosted the Yalta 
Conference in 1945. Nor were there greetings from the 
leaders of Britain or the United States.1 Every political 
leader whose greetings never reached Yalta on Febru-
ary 4th had his own reasons to overlook the anniver-
sary of the conference that shaped the modern world 
and plunged it into almost half a century of cold war.
In the opinion of the Polish historian Jerzy Jedlicki, 
the twentieth-century history of Eastern Europe is “a per-
fect laboratory to observe how the genuine or apparent 
remembrances of the past may aggravate current con-
flicts and how they themselves are modified in the pro-
cess.” According to Jedlicki, the most intriguing ques-
tion that the study of Eastern Europe can help answer 
is: “What factors activate historical reminiscences, and 
what circumstances would rather allow them to remain 
dormant and apparently forgotten. In other words, col-
1.On the symposium organized by the Crimean authorities to 
mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Yalta Conference, see Liudmila 
Obukhovskaia, “Imet' uvazhenie k proshlomu,” Krymskaia pravda,
9 February 2005. There is an extensive literature on the conference, 
most of it published during the Cold War. For a post-Cold War assess-
ment of the decisions made at Yalta, see Lloyd C. Gardner, Spheres of 
Influence: The Great Powers Partition Europe, from Munich to Yalta 
(Chicago, 1993).
lective ‘memories' may become ‘hot' or ‘cooled,' and the 
course of events may often depend on their emotional 
temperature.”2 I propose to examine patterns of collec-
tiv  remembrance and forgetting of historical events of 
international importance by analyzing public debates 
on the legacy of the Yalta Conference in Russia, Latvia, 
Poland, Ukraine, and the United States. I consider the 
interrelations between politics and historical representa-
tions in each of these countries, and the impact of the 
changing international situation on the ways in which 
intellectual and political elites interpret the importance 
of the Yalta agreements. In conclusion, I analyze the 
narrative strategies employed by the “winners” and 
“losers” of Yalta in representing their vision of the past.
Since the end of the First World War and the disinte-
gration of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman 
empires, Eastern Europe has been an arena for the com-
peting interests of new nation-states and the ambitions of 
great powers. After the German vision of Mitteleuropa as 
a Berlin-dominated space between Germany and Russia 
evaporated in the wake of the German defeat in the First 
World War, and the Bolshevik revolutionary advance on 
Europe was thrown back in 1920 by the “miracle on the 
Vistula,” the territory between the Baltic and Adriatic 
seas became a contested ground between the capitalist 
West and the Communist East. While Britain and France 
regarded the newly independent countries of the region 
as a “cordon sanitaire” against Bolshevik expansion, the 
Soviets tried to undermine some of the new regimes by 
turning their republics of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia 
into a socialist Piedmont for the national minorities of 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Eventually Stalin 
used the irredentist argument to divide Eastern Europe 
with Hitler in 1939. As Britain and France entered the 
Second World War over the German invasion of Poland, 
London considered the restoration of Poland's indepen-
dence and British interests in the region one of its main 
objectives in the war. The Yalta Conference effectively 
put an end to those plans, since Soviet armies occupied
2. See Jerzy Jedlicki, “Historical Memory as a Source of Con-
flicts in Eastern Europe,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 32, 
no. 3 (September 1999): 225-32, here 226.
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most of Eastern Europe, and Churchill failed to per-
suade Roosevelt to back British policy in the region. 
Yalta initiated the era of Soviet domination of Eastern 
Europe, which lasted until the end of the Cold War and 
left bitter memories of Western betrayal and Soviet 
dominance in the collective memory of the region.3
The events leading to the disintegration of the Soviet 
bloc in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the USSR, and 
the emergence of new nation-states on the ruins of the 
communist empire have often been treated by historians 
as a manifestation of “the revenge of the past.”4 It would 
be difficult indeed to exaggerate the role of history in 
the rearticulation of national identities in post-commu-
nist Eastern Europe. The recovery of collective memory 
suppressed by authoritarian regimes and recollections of 
the region's traumatic experiences during and after the 
Second World War not only helped boost the national 
pride of the newly freed nations, but also fueled ethnic 
and sectarian conflicts from the Balkans in the west to 
Nagornyi Karabakh in the east. 5 The European borders 
established at Yalta generally survived the historical and 
national resurgence of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Germany was reunited, but there was no adjustment to 
its eastern border as of 1989. Czechoslovakia split into 
two states, but their borders remained those established 
immediately after the Second World War. Nor was there 
any change in the borders of Poland or the former Soviet 
republics of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, all of which 
“inherited” part of Poland's interwar territory. Does this 
mean that the new national elites are satisfied with the 
map of Eastern Europe as drawn at Yalta, or do they still 
harbor grudges against the authors of the Yalta agree-
ments? The historical “amnesia” of the world leaders 
who forgot to send their greetings to the Yalta sympo-
sium in February 2005 indicates that while the Yalta 
borders generally remained intact, the historical and 
political consequences of the decisions made at Yalta 
in 1945 continue to haunt the world's political elites.
3. On the origins of the concept of Mitteleuropa and its transfor-
mation into the notion of Eastern and, later, East-Central Europe, see 
Erhardt Busek and Emil Brix, Projekt Mitteleuropa (Vienna, 1986);
Hubert Laszkiewicz, “A Quest for Identity: East-Central Europe and 
Its Historians,” in East-Central Europe's Position within Europe: 
Between East and West, ed. Jerzy Ktoczowski (Lublin, 2004), pp. 
60-74.
4. See Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nation-
alism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford,
1993).
5. On the role of history in post-communist Eastern Europe, see 
Tina Rosenberg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe's Ghosts after 
Communism (New York, 1996); John Borneman, Settling Accounts:
Violence, Justice, and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe (Prin-
ceton, 1997); Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through 
History (New York, 1993).
The Ghosts of Yalta
Vladimir Putin had more reason than any world 
leader to “forget” the sixtieth anniversary of the Yalta 
Conference. In early 2005 he faced a growing inter-
national crisis whose roots could be traced back to the 
legacy of Yalta. Russia ended 2004 as a big loser in 
international relations: its intervention in the Ukrainian 
presidential elections on the side of a pro-Russian candi-
date with a well-known criminal record and underground 
connections backfired. The Orange Revolution brought 
to power a Western-leaning and pro-democratic Ukrai-
nian opposition leader, Viktor Yushchenko. Russia was 
losing control over its closest neighbor, whose territory 
now included the Crimea and the site of the Yalta Confer-
ence. In December 2004, the Russian minister of foreign 
affairs, Sergei Lavrov, suggested to the American sec-
retary of state, Colin Powell, that Ukraine was part of 
the Russian sphere of influence—a statement that had all 
the hallmarks of a Yalta-type approach to international 
affairs. It was intended to counter Western criticism of 
Russia's meddling in the Ukrainian elections and per-
suade the American leadership to give an increasingly 
authoritarian Russia a free hand in proceeding against 
democratic governments on the territory of the former 
Soviet Union. Powell rebuffed Lavrov's suggestion: 
the United States regarded developments in Ukraine 
as proof that democracy was on the march all over the 
world, from the Middle East to the former Soviet Union.6
While the American administration rejected the 
Yalta-inspired principle of the division of the world into 
spheres of influence, politicians in Germany and Japan— 
the main “losers” of the Yalta agreements—rejected not 
only the principles underlying the Yalta decisions but 
also the legitimacy of Russian territorial acquisitions 
approved by the Crimean conference. In October 2004 
the opposition parties in the German parliament raised 
questions about the continuing militarization of the for-
mer East Prussia, allocated to Russia by the Big Three in 
February 1945 and known as the Kaliningrad oblast ever 
since. They suggested calling an international conference 
with the participation of organizations representing Ger-
mans resettled from East Prussia to discuss the economic 
development of the region, which they referred to as the
Konigsberg oblast. They also suggested the creation of
a Lithuanian-Polish-Russian cross-border region to be
called “Prussia.” The Russian government was appalled. 
Stressing that Gerhard Schroeder's government had no 
territorial claims against Russia, Sergei Lavrov con-
demned those German politicians who had raised the
6. For a Russian commentary on the outcome of discussions 
between Powell and Lavrov during a conference of foreign minis-
ters of OSCE member nations in Sofia, see Artur Blinov and Artem 




question of the lost territories.7 If in Germany the gov-
ernment decided against opening the can of worms rep-
resented by the post-Second World War European bor-
ders, in Japan there has always been a national consensus 
favoring the return of territories lost to Russia as a result 
of the Second World War. The Japanese government 
never recognized the loss of the southern Kurile Islands, 
which were “awarded” to the Soviet Union by the Yalta 
Conference, and continues to insist on the return of what 
it calls the “northern territories.” In the spring of 2005, 
the Japanese parliament adopted a resolution increasing 
the number of islands that it wanted back from Russia. 
The return of those islands is regarded as a precondition 
for the signing of a peace treaty, the absence of which has 
clouded Russo-Japanese political, cultural and economic 
relations ever since the end of the Second World War.8
In early 2005 Russia's neighbors to the west, the 
Balts and Poles, attacked the Russian government for 
its failure to apologize for Stalin's occupation of East-
ern Europe, which had been sanctioned by the decisions 
of the Yalta Conference. The attacks came in response 
to Russia's decision to invite world leaders to Moscow 
to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the victory over 
fascist Germany in May 2005. Cashing in on the hero-
ism and sacrifice of the Soviet peoples in World War II, 
the Russian government was hoping to carry out a public 
relations coup and improve its international image, which 
was suffering from growing authoritarian tendencies, the 
persecution of independent-minded business tycoons 
such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and the continuing war 
in Chechnya. The failure of Russian policy in Ukraine 
added urgency to the government's resolve to appear in 
the international arena wearing the mantle of principal 
victor over fascism and savior of Europe from Nazi rule. 
VE Day, however, brought not only liberation from fas-
cism, but also Soviet occupation of Eastern and Central 
Europe, which lasted in one form or another for more 
than forty years. The leaders of the “captive” nations were 
now determined to remind the world of that episode and, 
in the process, to encourage Russia to face its Stalinist 
past and acknowledge the atrocities committed in East-
ern Europe by the Soviet Union and its Communist allies.
The Baltic Front
The Russian invitation to the leaders of East Euro-
pean nations to attend VE Day celebrations in Mos-
cow aroused heated discussions in the Baltic states. At 
the core of Russo-Baltic tensions was the question of 
whether the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states, tacitly
7. See Evgenii Grigor'ev, “MID RF otstoial Kaliningrad,” Neza- 
visimaia gazeta, 16 November 2004.
8. See Artem Blinov, “Tokio daiut trubu, no ne ostrova,” Nezavi- 
simaia gazeta, 17 January 2005; idem, “Ul'timatum proigravshego,” 
Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 March 2005.
approved by the Yalta Conference, was or was not an act 
of occupation. The answer to that question had serious 
legal and political repercussions for Russia, as it would 
affect the status of the Russian minority in Latvia and 
place on the international agenda not only the issue of 
Russia's moral responsibility for an act of aggression but 
also its legal consequences. Potentially, the Russian gov-
ernment faced lawsuits demanding material compensa-
tion for the imprisonment, deportation and death of hun-
dreds of thousands if not millions of citizens of the Baltic 
states. The Russian political elites took the issue so seri-
ously that they were prepared to soften their demands 
on the issue of the human rights of Russian speakers in 
the Baltic states—their main weapon in diplomatic con-
flicts with the Baltics throughout the 1990s—if Latvia 
and Estonia would drop their claims for recognition 
of the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states as an act of 
occupation. On February 3, 2005 (the eve of the sixti-
eth anniversary of the Yalta Conference), the Russian 
side leaked to the press drafts of unsigned joint decla-
rations on Russo-Estonian and Russo-Latvian relations 
that included a quid pro quo agreement in that regard.9
The debate over the participation of the presidents 
of the Baltic states in the VE Day celebrations in Mos-
cow became especially acute in Latvia, the home of the 
largest Russian minority in the Baltics. Indeed, it crossed 
national boundaries and caused an international scandal. 
The president of Latvia, Dr. Vaira Vike-Freiberga—her- 
self a refugee from Soviet rule and a former professor of 
psychology at the University of Montreal, known in Rus-
sian diplomatic circles as the “Canadian”—has been a 
strong advocate of the thesis that Soviet rule in her coun-
try amounted to an occupation. She has not been reluc-
tant to express that conviction at home and abroad, and in 
January 2005, at the ceremony marking the sixtieth anni-
versary of the liberation of the prisoners of the Ausch-
witz concentration camp, she presented President Putin 
with a book promoting that interpretation of the history 
of Russo-Latvian relations. The Russian response was 
swift and decisive. The publication of the book, entitled 
The History of Latvia: The Twentieth Century, was offi-
cially condemned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation, and when a Russian translation 
of the volume was subsequently launched in Moscow, 
one of its authors was denied an entry visa to Russia.10 *
Not surprisingly, Dr. Vike-Freiberga was highly 
reluctant from the outset to participate in the Mos-
cow commemorations. Only later, under pressure from
9. On the history of the Baltic states after the Soviet takeover, see 
Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, The Baltic States: Years of 
Dependence, 1940-1990 (Berkeley, 1990).
10. On the controversy accompanying the Moscow launch of 
the book presented by Vike-Freiberga to Putin, see Ivan Gorshkov,




President George W. Bush of the United States, did she 
change her mind and accept the invitation, becoming the 
only Baltic head of state to attend. The Latvian presi-
dent stated that she would take part in the ceremony in 
Moscow out of respect for the Russian people and their 
sacrifice in the fight against Nazism, but she stood firm 
when it came to the interpretation of Latvian history and 
Russo-Latvian relations after the Second World War. 
Speaking on the Latvian radio program Krustpunkti, she 
suggested that Russia's harshly negative reaction to the 
Latvian viewpoint precluded open discussion on impor-
tant questions of recent history, while other countries 
were making attempts to reevaluate their past. According 
to the Latvian president, Soviet-era stereotypes contin-
ued to dominate the Russian interpretation of the Second 
World War and the postwar era. In an article published in 
Der Tagesspiegel on May 6, 2005, Vike-Freiberga reiter-
ated her earlier statement, arguing that after the expul-
sion of the Nazis, Latvia and the other Baltic states had 
become victims of Soviet occupation, which resulted in 
mass arrests, killings and deportations of their citizens. 
She also suggested that both Latvia and Germany had 
faced their record in World War II, while Russia refused 
to separate its heroes from its tyrants and condemn 
the atrocities committed in the name of communism.11
The Polish Revolt
If in the Baltic states the decisions of the Yalta Con-
ference were seen as a mere confirmation by the Western 
powers of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which delivered 
the Balts into Stalin's hands, in Poland those decisions 
were viewed as a separate matter. There the Yalta debate
coincided with discussions about President Aleksander
Kwasniewski's possible visit to Moscow for the VE Day 
celebrations. The tone and direction of the debate pro-
voked strong criticism on the part of Moscow. As in the 
case of Russo-Latvian disagreements over the interpreta-
tion of the Soviet past, the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs took it upon itself to present the Russian point of 
view on the matter. On February 12, 2005, sixty years to 
the day after the conclusion of the Yalta Conference, the 
Information and Press Department of the ministry issued 
a statement distributed by the government-controlled 
press agency ITAR-TASS. The authors of the statement 
took issue with those Polish authors and politicians who 
regarded Yalta as a symbol of Poland's betrayal by its 
Western allies and of the subsequent Soviet occupation. 
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested what 
it called an attempt to rewrite the history of the Second
11. See Vaira Vike-Freiberga, “Was RuBland von Deutschland
lernen kann,” Der Tagesspiegel, May 6, 2005. For Russian reaction
to Vike-Freiberga's decision to come to Moscow for the VE Day cel-
ebrations, see Kirill Reznik-Martov, “Bush priglasil prezidenta Latvii 
v Moskvu,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, February 8, 2005.
World War and take historical events out of context. It 
asserted that the participants in the Yalta Conference had 
wanted to see Poland strong, free, independent and dem-
ocratic. The fact that the Soviet Union did everything in 
its power to turn that country into anything but a strong, 
free, independent and democratic state apparently was 
not considered by the authors of the statement to be part 
of the historical context. Another Russian argument in 
favor of the Yalta decisions dealt with the extension of 
the Polish borders to the north and west and the recogni-
tion of those borders by the Big Three at Yalta and Pots-
dam. The statement conveniently overlooked the fact 
that Poland lost its eastern lands, and, by incorporating 
western territories previously settled by ethnic Germans, 
became an accomplice in Stalin's partition of Europe.12
It is not clear what the initiators of the Russian 
Foreign Ministry's statement expected, but it created 
a great deal of negative publicity in the Polish media. 
Critics immediately pointed out that as a result of the 
Yalta decisions, Poland found itself under the control of 
a totalitarian regime and not only gained but also lost 
territory. Still, the Polish media was not prepared to 
open the Pandora's box of the postwar European border 
settlements. Some observers even asserted that if Lviv 
had remained in Poland after the war, it would probably 
have become a Polish Belfast. Generally, when it came 
to countering Russian arguments on the significance of 
the Yalta decisions, the Polish media treated them with 
a kind of fatalism—what else could one expect of the 
Russians? Commentators stated that it would be unrea-
sonable to think that Moscow could condemn the deci-
sions made at Yalta with the participation of Roosevelt 
and Churchill if it still refused to admit its failure to 
support the Warsaw uprising of 1944 or release all avail-
able information on the Soviet execution of thousands 
of Polish prisoners of war in Katyn Forest in 1940.13 
The Katyn massacre of more than twenty thousand
Polish prisoners of war by Soviet security forces has 
always been high on the list of Polish grievances against 
Russia.14 In the spring of 2005, some commentators even
12. See the commentary of the Information and Press Depart-
ment of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mid. 
ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/314872473059B3E2C3256FA60060BAC4.
13. For the Polish discussion of the consequences of the Yalta 
Conference in response to the statement issued by the Russian Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs, see Tadeusz M. Pluzanski, “Jalta - zwyci^stwo 
Stalina, zdrada Zachodu,” February 26, 2005, mazowsze.k-raj.com. 
pl/pluzanski.shtml; Marek Ostrowski, “Druz'iam moskovitam,” 
http://www.pravda.ru/world/2005/5/14/38/19148_Polska.html, and 
the transcript of the discussion on Radio Swoboda on March 16, 2005, 
with the participation of Polina Oldenburg and Aleksei Dzikovitsky, 
http://www.svoboda.org/archive/.
14. There is an extensive literature on the Katyn massacre. At 
the time of writing, the latest monograph on the subject is George 
Sanford's Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and 
Memory (London and New York, 2005).
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suggested that Kwasniewski's visit to Russia for the VE 
Day celebrations would be justified only if he used the 
occasion to lay flowers at the mass graves of Polish offi-
cers in Katyn Forest. Even the last Communist ruler of 
Poland, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who was invited to 
attend the celebrations in Moscow and intended to visit 
his father's grave in Siberia, stated that he did not under-
stand why the Russians were reluctant to tell the whole 
truth about Katyn and publish the available documents.15 
Opposition leaders in parliament, including the future 
president ofPoland, Lech Kaczynski, declared themselves 
against Kwasniewski's visit to Moscow. But the Catholic 
Church hierarchy and majority public opinion supported 
the visit, as did the government, which maintained that 
it would not amount to a ratification of the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 or the Yalta decisions of 1945.
In his interview with the German daily Die Welt 
in late February, Kwasniewski stated that he intended 
to go to Moscow to celebrate the end of the bloodiest 
dictatorship in human history, but would not accept the 
invitation if it were for a ceremony marking either the 
anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact or of the 
Yalta Conference. Like the Baltic presidents before him, 
Kwasniewski noted President George W. Bush's earlier 
statements that Yalta had led to the partition of Europe 
and failed to bring freedom to significant numbers of 
Europeans. Kwasniewski believed that the anniversary 
of the end of the war in Europe presented Putin with an 
opportunity to remind the world of the contribution of 
the Russian and other Soviet peoples to the victory over 
fascism and to give a just assessment of what had taken 
place after the war. In early May 2005, before leaving for 
Moscow, Kwasniewski addressed his compatriots at the 
Polish VE Day celebrations in Wroclaw. According to the 
Polish State Information Agency (PAP), Kwasniewski 
stated: “Yalta was painful... for Poles, above all, because 
the declarations on independent and democratic Poland 
were not kept.” He added, however, that “thanks to 
the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, our country built 
and continues to build its sovereignty and found new 
opportunities for development in the west and north.” 
Kwasniewski condemned the Soviet killings of Polish 
patriots after the war, stating, “We remember with indig-
nation and bitterness that when fireworks exploded in the 
Moscow sky to celebrate the victorious end of the war, 
sixteen leaders of the Polish Underground were incar-
cerated in the Lubianka Prison, and three of them were 
murdered.” Having calmed public opinion at home and 
countered his opponents' calls to turn down Putin's invi-
tation, Kwasniewski was ready to depart for Moscow.16
15. See Wojciech Jaruzelski, “Ich empfand den 8. Mai als riesige 
Erleichterung, ” Die Welt, May 3, 2005.
16. See Jacek Lepiarz's summary of Kwasniewski's interview
with Die Welt in the online version of Polityka, February 27, 2005.
There he was in for a major surprise that strength-
ened the hand of those who had opposed the visit from 
the outset and advised him not to go to Russia. In his 
speech at the festivities President Putin omitted Poland 
from his list of nations that had contributed to the victory 
over fascism. This apparently came as a surprise not only 
to Mr. Kwasniewski, but also to his Communist prede-
cessor, Wojciech Jaruzelski, who had boasted before his 
trip to Moscow that he was going to Russia as a repre-
sentative of the fourth largest army in the anti-Hitlerite 
coalition. Whether Putin's omission of Poland in his VE 
Day speech was deliberate or not, it helped bring Pol-
ish-Russian relations to a new low. As was later admitted 
by Artem Malgin, the coordinator of the Polish-Russian 
Forum on European Politics, official Russia lost a unique 
opportunity to improve its image abroad. In Poland, 
according to Malgin, Russian diplomats did not show suf-
ficient flexibility, as they failed to shift discussion from 
topics harmful to Russo-Polish relations and focus on 
useful ones instead. One such topic, suggested Malgin, 
was the current status of veterans of the Ukrainian Insur-
gent Army, who had fought not only against the Germans 
but also against the Poles and Soviets. In Malgin's view, 
Russia had failed to exploit the generally positive opin-
ion in Polish government and society of the role played 
by the Soviet Union in the Second World War. In the Bal-
tic states, where the governments adopted an “anti-VE” 
stand, the best option for Russia was allegedly to ignore 
the historical debate altogether. Malgin warned his read-
ers against assuming that there was a coordinated West-
ern information offensive against Russia and called upon 
them to continue working for the improvement of Rus-
sia's image abroad. Given the degree to which that image 
had been damaged by the debates over the legacy of the 
Yalta Conference, Malgin's advice was timely indeed.17
Meanwhile, the Russian authorities preferred to put 
on a brave face and interpret the criticism of their coun-
try's post-Second World War role in Eastern Europe as an 
indication of the growing strength of the Russian state. 
Thus the Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated 
that in 1995, when the world celebrated the fiftieth anni-
versary of the victory over fascism, no one had bothered 
to present historical claims against Russia, since it was a 
weak state at the time. As Russia grew stronger, its neigh-
bors became concerned about its new might and decided 
to advance their historical claims. According to Lavrov, 
one of the factors that worried Russia's detractors was 
its desire to lessen its treasury's dependence on energy 
exports. This was a peculiar claim to make at a time
On Kwasniewski's participation in the Wroclaw commemora-
tions, see Trybuna.com.pl, http://www.trybuna.com.pl/n_show. 
php?code=2005050903.
17. See Artem Mal'gin, “Nad imidzhem pridetsia rabotat',” Neza- 
visimaia gazeta, May 16, 2005.
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when much of Russia's economic recovery was fueled 
by the country's energy exports and rising oil prices.18
The Second Front:
The Americans Join In
Lavrov's questionable argument, which linked 
energy policy with the history of the Second World 
War, appears less strange if one considers the interplay 
of two similar factors in the speech given by President 
George W. Bush in Riga on May 6, 2005. Bush entered 
the East European historical debate head on, placing the 
legacy of the Yalta agreements within the broader con-
text of the progress of freedom throughout the world and 
American support for democracy in countries ranging 
from former Soviet republics to Iraq, the latter occu-
pied by American troops. As Bush presented it, democ-
racy was the link between America's policy in Eastern 
Europe after the Second World War and its policy in 
the oil-rich Middle East. But this is the only parallel 
that one might draw between the Russian and Ameri-
can positions on the significance of the Yalta decisions.
As he accepted Vladimir Putin's invitation to attend 
the VE Day celebrations in Moscow and encouraged 
others, such as President Vike-Freiberga of Latvia, to do 
likewise, Bush decided to take the opportunity to visit 
not only Russia but also Latvia and Georgia, two for-
mer Soviet republics whose recent relations with Russia 
were far from smooth. The message was clear. Although 
the U.S. administration cared about maintaining good 
relations with Russia, it was not relinquishing its sup-
port of democratic processes in former Soviet republics 
struggling to escape the Russian sphere of influence. 
In Latvia, Bush apparently felt obliged to take a stand 
on the legacy of the Yalta Conference, given the pro-
longed debate in that country on the history of Russo- 
Latvian relations during and after the Second World 
War. Referring to the conference in his Riga speech, 
Bush deliberately took the East European side in the 
ongoing debate. Indeed, he showed his readiness to go 
further than any of his predecessors in acknowledging 
American complicity in the Yalta division of Europe.
“As we mark a victory of six days ago—six decades 
ago, we are mindful of a paradox,” stated Bush. “For 
much of Germany, defeat led to freedom. For much of 
Eastern and Central Europe, victory brought the iron 
rule of another empire. VE Day marked the end of fas-
cism, but it did not end oppression. The agreement at 
Yalta followed in the unjust tradition of Munich and the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Once again, when powerful
18. See the interview with Sergei Lavrov in Izvestiia,
May 17, 2005. Cf. the text of the interview on the website of 
the Information and Press Department of the Russian Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/
1B0BC3CE4ACCA28EC32570040020C546.
governments negotiated, the freedom of small nations 
was somehow expendable. Yet this attempt to sacrifice 
freedom for the sake of stability left a continent divided 
and unstable. The captivity of millions in Central and 
Eastern Europe will be remembered as one of the great-
est wrongs of history.”19 A U.S. administration official 
later revealed that the Yalta remark was intended as an 
invitation for Putin to apologize for the Molotov-Rib-
bentrop Pact. If that was indeed the case, then the White 
House speechwriters clearly miscalculated, for the 
remark did nothing to change Russia's position on the 
issue. Bush certainly scored points with leaders of the 
“new Europe,” but he also created unexpected problems 
for his administration at home. The speech reignited 
the old debate between Republicans and Democrats 
over the role of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in what his 
critics called the “sellout” of Eastern Europe to Joseph 
Stalin. Conservative journalists and commentators such 
as Pat Buchanan and Anne Applebaum praised Bush's 
remarks as a long overdue recognition of the “awful 
truth,” while liberals, represented by a number of histo-
rians of U.S. foreign policy and the Cold War, accused 
the Republicans of reviving the spirit of Joseph McCar-
thy. The Democrats maintained that the Yalta Confer-
ence had done little more than recognize the reality on 
the ground, given that by the time of the Crimean summit 
Stalin had already gained control of Eastern Europe.20 * *
The Riga speech was by no means the first pub-
lic statement in which President Bush criticized the 
Yalta agreements. He had done so on previous occa-
sions as well, always expressing his criticism in remarks 
addressed to East European audiences. Those remarks 
were apparently designed to placate allies of the United 
States in the new Europe, demonstrating American 
concern about the consequences of an event crucial to 
their history. They were also aimed at President Putin, 
encouraging him to be more honest in his assessment of 
the role played by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe 
in the 1930s and 1940s. In the past, Bush's criticism 
of the Yalta agreements had failed to convince Putin 
to alter Russia's official interpretation of the event, but 
it was clearly appreciated by the East European elites.
When it comes to American discourse on Yalta, 
Bush's critique did not so much follow in the footsteps 
of Joseph McCarthy, as claimed by his Democratic crit-
ics, but echoed statements made by leading figures in 
President Bill Clinton's administration. In March 1999 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the daughter of 
a Czechoslovak diplomat who escaped to the West after
19. For the text of Bush's speech, see http://www.white- 
house.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050507-8.html.
20. For a survey of the American debate prompted by Bush's
Riga speech, see Elisabeth Bumiller, “In row over Yalta, Bush pokes
at Baltic politics,” International Herald Tribune, May 16, 2005.
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the communist takeover, stated to representatives of East 
European governments: “Never again will your fates be 
tossed around like poker chips on a bargaining table.” In 
fact, Albright was developing an argument made earlier 
by her deputy and Clinton's classmate Strobe Talbott. 
“After World War II,” remarked Talbott in May 1997, 
“many countries in the east suffered half a century under 
the shadow of Yalta. That is a place name that has come to 
be a codeword for the cynical sacrifice of small nations' 
freedom to great powers' spheres of influence, just as Ver-
sailles has come to signify a shortsighted, punitive, and 
humiliating peace that sows the seeds of future war.”21
Why, then, were the liberal opponents of President 
Bush so critical of his Riga speech? Leaving aside the 
political dynamics of May 2005, it should be noted that 
Bush was much more explicit in his critique of the Yalta 
agreements than his Democratic predecessors, especially 
as he compared Yalta not to Versailles but to Munich and 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. In so doing, he indeed 
revived some of the ghosts of the McCarthy era. “The 
Munich Called Yalta” was the title of a chapter contrib-
uted by William H. Chamberlin to a book published in 
1950 that criticized American diplomacy for appeas-
ing Stalin and sacrificing the independence of Poland 
and the national interests of China.22 By contrast, the 
comparison with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a 
new addition to the decades-old controversy introduced 
by the author of the Riga speech, presidential assistant 
Michael Gerson.23 It seemed appropriate to mention the 
division of Europe between Germany and the USSR in 
1939 in a speech made in Latvia, where the memory of 
the Hitler-Stalin deal is alive and well more than sixty- 
five years after the event, and where every schoolchild 
knows that at Yalta Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to 
Soviet territorial acquisitions based on that pact. Not 
so in the U.S. By drawing attention to the connection 
between the pact and the Yalta agreements, Bush opened 
the door to possible comparisons of FDR not only with 
Neville Chamberlain but also with Hitler and Stalin. 
More than anything else, it was that sacrilegious sug-
gestion that provoked attacks on the administration from 
the belligerent Democrats—attacks that the White House 
had not expected and would have preferred to avoid.
What were the arguments on both sides of the 
Yalta debate in the United States? It would appear that 
the opposing parties contributed very little new material 
to the debate that reached its climax in the 1950s and
21. Quoted in Matt Welch, “When Men Were Men and Conti-
nents Were Divided,” Reason on Line, May 10, 2005, www.reason. 
com/hitandrun/2005/05/when_men_were_m.shtml.
22. See William Henry Chamberlin, “The Munich Called Yalta,” 
in The Yalta Conference, ed. Richard F. Fenno, 2d ed. (Lexington, 
Mass., Toronto, and London, 1972), pp. 84-98.
23. See Bumiller, “In row over Yalta, Bush pokes at Baltic 
politics.”
1960s. On the Democratic side, the old arguments were 
summarized and reiterated by a participant in the aca-
demic debates of the 1960s, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. In his 
commentary on Bush's Riga speech, he stated that the 
president “is under the delusion that tougher diplomacy 
might have preserved the freedom of small European 
nations.” Schlesinger rebuffed that thesis, stating that “it 
was the deployment of armies, not negotiated conces-
sions, that caused the division of Europe.” He reminded 
his readers that at the time of the Yalta Conference East-
ern Europe was already occupied by the Red Army, and 
conflict with the USSR was inconceivable as long as the 
war with Japan was still going on. Among the achieve-
ments of the Yalta Conference, Schlesinger listed Sta-
lin's promise to enter the war with Japan at a time when 
“the atom bomb seemed to be a fantasy dreamed up by 
nuclear physicists,” and FDR's success in making Stalin 
sign the Declaration on Liberated Europe, which obliged 
the Soviets to conduct free elections in the countries of 
Eastern Europe that they occupied.24 Jacob Heilbrunn, 
writing in the Los Angeles Times, put forward another 
important argument in favor of Yalta that Schlesinger 
had overlooked. He claimed that refusing to make a deal 
with Stalin on Eastern Europe “would have seriously 
jeopardized the common battle against Germany.”25
The defenders of Bush's Riga speech did not, of 
course, argue that the West should have gone to war with 
the Soviet Union, jeopardized the victory over Hitler, or 
impeded the war effort in the Pacific. Their argument, 
like the reasoning of their opponents, was deeply rooted 
in formulas developed in the political and scholarly 
debates of the 1950s and 1960s. Pat Buchanan, for exam-
ple, titled his article on the issue “Was WWII Worth It? 
For Stalin, Yes,” echoing the title of the chapter “Stalin's 
Greatest Victory” in Chester Wilmot's book The Struggle 
for Europe (1952).26 Buchanan juxtaposed Putin's rheto-
ric about the Soviet liberation of eleven countries with 
Bush's admission that many of the European countries 
liberated from fascism found themselves under another 
form of oppression as a result of the agreements reached 
at Yalta. Siding with Bush, Buchanan accused FDR and 
Churchill of selling out Eastern Europe to one of history's 
deadliest tyrants, Joseph Stalin. Following in the foot-
steps of prewar American isolationists, he also questioned
24. See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “Yalta Delusions,” The Huff-
ington Post, May 9, 2005, www.huffingtonpost.com/theblog/ 
archive/2005/05/yalta-delusions.html. Here Schlesinger summarized 
some of his arguments presented in the October 1967 issue of Foreign 
Affairs. For a reprint of the article, see “Origins of the Cold War” in
The Yalta Conference, pp. 152-83.
25. See Jacob Heilbrunn, “Once Again, the Big Yalta Lie,” Los 
Angeles Times, May 10, 2005.
26. See Pat Buchanan, “Was WWII Worth It? For Stalin,
Yes,” AntiWar.com, May 11, 2005, http://www.antiwar.com/ 
pat?articleid=5899. Cf. Chester Wilmot, “Stalin's Greatest Victory,” in
The Yalta Conference, pp. 59-84.
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the rationale behind American involvement in a war that 
took 50 million lives. Echoes of the earlier debates were 
also to be heard in the National Review editorial “Yalta 
Regrets,” which stated that the United States could have 
won the war against Japan without Soviet participation.27
Anne Applebaum, on the other hand, added some new 
emphases to the old theme as she attacked “a small crew 
of liberal historians and Rooseveltians,” who claimed 
that “Yalta was a recognition of reality rather than a 
sellout.” “Their charges,” according to Applebaum, 
“ignore the breadth of the agreement—was it really nec-
essary to agree to deport thousands of expatriate Rus-
sians back to certain death in the Soviet Union?—as well 
as the fact that Yalta and the other wartime agreements 
went beyond mere recognition of Soviet occupation 
and conferred legality and international acceptance on 
new borders and political structures.” The new element 
in this conservative argument was the conviction with 
which the author spoke about Stalin's crimes and the 
complicity of the Western powers in them. Applebaum, 
the author of an acclaimed book on the Gulag based on 
archival materials that became available after the col-
lapse of the USSR, knew exactly what she was talking 
about when she wrote of the “certain death” awaiting 
former Soviet citizens shipped back to the USSR by the 
American and British military. “The tone was right,” 
stated Applebaum with regard to Bush's speech, “and it 
contrasted sharply with the behavior of Russian presi-
dent Vladimir Putin, as perhaps it was intended to. Asked 
again last week why he hadn't made his own apology for 
the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe, Putin pointed 
out that the Soviet parliament did so in 1989. ‘What,' 
he asked, ‘we have to do this every day, every year?'”28
The Long Shadow of “Uncle Joe”
Putin was certainly in no mood for apologies during the 
Moscow celebrations of VE Day, and Bush did not insist 
on them. He stated in his remarks about his Moscow visit 
that he was dealing with a friend. The American president 
remained silent regarding Putin's encroachment on demo-
cratic institutions and liberties in Russia—a silence under-
stood by the Russian media as tacit support for Putin.29
During the first half of 2005, the decisions adopted 
by the Yalta Conference were discussed by the Russian 
media in a number of contexts, including the long-term 
implications of the disintegration of the international 
system created at that conference. On the eve of the Yalta
27. See “Yalta Regrets,” National Review online, May 11, 2005, 
www.nationalreview.com/editorial/editorial2200505110923.asp.
28. Anne Applebaum, “Saying Sorry,” Washington Post, May 11, 
2005, p. A17.
29. See Iuliia Petrovskaia, “Troinaia diplomatiia Busha,”
Nezavisimaia gazeta, May 11, 2005; Artur Blinov, “Ia sidel riadom s
drugom,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, May 13, 2005.
commemorations, the Russian state-run news agency 
Novosti released an interview with Valentin Falin, the 
former head of the international department of the Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. The veteran of Soviet diplomacy declared the 
Yalta agreements to be the best chance the world had ever 
had to end the threat of war. Falin interpreted attacks on 
the agreement as denunciations of the legacy of President 
Roosevelt, whom he held in the highest regard. Quoting 
from Edward R. Stettinius's memoirs of the Yalta Con-
ference, Falin rejected the assumption that Stalin, whom 
President Roosevelt almost affectionately called “Uncle 
Joe,” had outmaneuvered his American counterpart at 
Yalta. He noted that both the idea for the creation of the 
United Nations Organization and the final communique 
on the conference were conceived by the Americans. 
Falin held President Harry Truman responsible for the 
failure of the Yalta agreements and the beginning of the 
Cold War. By reiterating that traditional Soviet-era view, 
Falin was, in effect, sending a new message to critics of 
Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe: if you do not 
like Yalta, address your grievances to the United States.
When asked specifically about the partition of Europe 
into spheres of influence, Falin first tried to dodge the 
question; when it was repeated, he used Soviet-era argu-
ments to present Soviet actions at the conference in the 
best possible light. He rejected the interviewer's sugges-
tion that any spheres of interest had been established at 
Yalta. Following Stalin's argument of 1945, Falin stated 
that the Curzon Line, which became the basis of the new 
border between Poland and the USSR, had been drawn 
not by the Russians but by the leaders of the U.S., Britain 
and France in 1919 on the basis of ethnographic maps. 
In his answer to a question about the Baltic states, Falin 
reminded his audience that they had been cut off from 
Soviet Russia during the Revolution by pro-German gov-
ernments and used by the West as a base for intervention 
against Russia. The United States, according to Falin, did 
not care about the independence of the Baltic countries as 
long as they supported the White government of Admi-
ral Kolchak, and Roosevelt had opposed the inclusion 
of the Baltic states in the USSR only because he did not 
want to lose the votes of Baltic immigrants in the U.S.30 
Falin clearly believed that Russia had nothing for which 
to apologize in relation to the Yalta decisions. That was 
also the opinion of Vadim Trukhachev, who commented 
in Pravda on an article by the Polish journalist Marek 
Ostrowski, noting that the latter had failed to mention that 
it was thanks to the insistence of the USSR that Poland had 
acquired its postwar western and northern territories.31
30. See “Ialta—shans, kotorym ne sumeli vospol'zovat'sia,” RIA 
“Novosti,” March 1, 2005.
31. See Trukhachev's translation of Ostrowski's article and his 
commentary on it in Pravda.ru for February 21, 2005, http://www.
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The Russian liberal press remained largely silent on 
the issue of Yalta in February 2005, when it was at the 
center of controversy in Eastern Europe. Yalta reemerged 
in Russian public discourse only in April 2005 within the 
context of a broader debate on Stalin's role in Russian 
history. The debate had begun in the late 1980s, with the 
onset of glasnost. It originally focused on the crimes com-
mitted by the Stalin regime, but acquired new character-
istics in the 1990s with the rise of Russian nationalism. 
More Russians adopted a positive attitude toward Stalin 
after 2000, as Vladimir Putin took power and authoritar-
ian tendencies came to the fore in Russian politics.32 In the 
spring of 2005, the Stalin debate was reignited by Zurab 
Tsereteli, arguably Russia's most productive and con-
troversial sculptor. In anticipation of the anniversary of 
the Yalta Conference, Tsereteli created a gigantic bronze 
sculpture of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill as depicted 
in numerous photographs taken in front of the Livadia 
Palace in February 1945. The sculpture, which is four 
meters tall and weighs ten tons, was originally supposed 
to be installed at the Second World War memorial near 
Moscow,33 but it was later offered to the Livadia munici-
pal council. The city council first accepted the offer and 
then turned it down. After that, the sculpture was offered 
to the war memorial in Volgograd, the site of the Battle 
of Stalingrad. By April 2004 the issue had attracted the 
attention of the Russian media and representatives of 
the Russian liberal elite, who issued an appeal protest-
ing the idea of installing the sculpture on Russian soil.
The authors of the appeal, who included Oleg Basi-
lashvili, Aleksandr Gelman, Daniil Granin, Oleg Taba-
kov, and the “grandfather of perestroika,” Aleksandr 
Yakovlev, regarded Tsereteli's depiction of the Big Three 
as an attempt to build a monument to Stalin and as a step 
toward his political rehabilitation in Russia. “For the 
first time since the revelation of Stalin's crimes against 
humanity,” wrote the authors of the appeal, “an attempt 
is being made in our country to put up a monument to 
him, and that on the sacred occasion of the sixtieth anni-
versary of Victory, which would have cost our nation 
considerably fewer victims had it not been for Stalin's 
‘purges' of military cadres and his glaring miscalcula-
tions in policy and strategy.”34 The statement was a direct 
response to those in the Russian nationalist camp and 
among the public at large who often cite Stalin's con-
tribution to the victory over Nazi Germany as the main 
argument for his rehabilitation. Ironically, the appeal was 
addressed not to the Russian public but to President Putin, 
who brought back the Stalin-era anthem of the USSR as 
the anthem of the new Russia and whose rule witnessed a 
rise in the popularity of the once dreaded generalissimo. 
It would appear that the liberal intellectuals who signed 
the appeal had no illusions about the presence in Russia 
of any force other than the authoritarian president capa-
ble of stopping the public rehabilitation of Joseph Stalin.
The Stalin controversy and the approaching celebra-
tions of VE Day finally brought the question of the Yalta 
Conference and the historical responsibility of the USSR 
(and, by extension, Russia) for its decisions to the atten-
tion of Russian liberals, giving them a legitimate voice 
in a discussion earlier dominated by officialdom. On 
April 3, 2005, Vladimir Pozner, the host of the popular 
Russian television program Vremena (Times), asked a 
guest who was to be credited with victory in the Great 
Patriotic war, Stalin or the people. The guest refused to 
distinguish between the two, and Pozner was later criti-
cized by Russian nationalists for trying to separate Stalin 
and the state from the people.35 But the liberals were not 
silenced. Writing in Izvestiia in late April 2005, Fedor 
Lukianov noted the danger of associating the end of 
the Second World War with the victory of the Russian 
state. He wrote: “But if that war is understood not as a 
heroic feat of the nation but as the political triumph of the 
Russian state, then we fall into a trap. One would then 
have to argue, foaming at the mouth, that Stalin acted 
as he should have done, the pact of 1939 was in accord 
with international law, and Yalta brought democracy to 
Eastern Europe.”36 Writing after the VE Day celebra-
tions in Moscow, Viktor Sheinis, a member of the liberal 
Yabloko Party, stated that at Yalta the Western leaders 
had approved the territorial acquisitions obtained by 
Stalin according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Those 
decisions blocked the progress of democracy in Eastern 
Europe for more than forty years, and it should come 
as no surprise that the East Europeans regarded Yalta 
as another Munich and refused to participate in the VE 
Day celebrations in Moscow. In Sheinis's opinion, “If 
one is to show respect for Churchill, who understood 
earlier than others what a mess Stalin's Western allies 
had made, then I would depict him not in a chair on the
pravda.ru/world/2005/5/14/38/19148_Polska.html
32. On the rise of Stalin's popularity in Putin's Russia, see Sarah 
E. Mendelson and Theodore P. Gerber, “Failing the Stalin Test,”
Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (January/February 2006): 2-8.
33. On the Russian politics of remembrance, as reflected in the 
composition of the memorial during the Yeltsin period, see Nurit Sch- 
leifman, “Moscow's Victory Park: A Monumental Change,” in History 
and Memory 13, no. 2 (2001): 5-34.
34. For the text of the appeal, see “Oskvernenie Dnia Pobedy,”
Grani, April 12, 2005, http://grani.ru/Society/m.87674.html.
35. See Iu. Krupnov, “Kto vyigral voinu? Narod ili Stalin?” 
Internet protiv teleekrana, October 10, 2005.
36. See Fedor Lukianov, “Den' Pobedy: mezhdunarodnyi 
aspekt,” Izvestiia, April 29, 2005, http://www.globalaffairs.ru/arti- 
cles/3986.html. Cf. Lukianov's much less critical article about Yalta in 




Crimean shore but at the rostrum in Fulton. But such a 
monument should not, of course, be erected at Yalta.”37
The Crimean Debate
What happened in and around Yalta in the spring of 
2005 that first prompted the municipal council of Liva- 
dia, the actual setting of the Crimean conference, first 
to accept Tsereteli's gift and then to refuse it? The city 
fathers changed their minds, by and large, for two rea-
sons. The first was the attitude of the Crimean Tatars, 
whom Stalin forcibly deported from the peninsula less 
than a year before the Yalta Conference. They were wel-
comed back by the government of independent Ukraine 
and became embroiled in a political struggle with the 
Russian-dominated Crimean parliament for the return 
of their political, cultural and economic rights in their 
historical homeland. The second reason was the posi-
tion taken by the Ukrainian government, the new mas-
ter of the Crimea and of the conference site. In 1954 
the Crimean peninsula, including Yalta, was trans-
ferred from the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation 
to that of the Ukrainian SSR, and in 1991 it became an 
autonomous republic within the independent Ukrainian 
state. Thus, by the spring of 2005, it was not only the 
citizens of Livadia but also the Mejlis (parliament) of 
the Crimean Tatars; the authorities in Simferopol, the 
capital of the Crimea; and the leadership of the Ukrai-
nian state in Kyiv who influenced the Livadia decision.
The decision to commemorate the sixtieth anniver-
sary of the Yalta Conference was made by the Ukrainian 
parliament on December 16, 2004, less than two months 
before the event. The reason for this last-minute deci-
sion was readily apparent, given that in November and 
December 2004 the Orange Revolution had thrown the 
Ukrainian parliament into turmoil. The decision on the 
Yalta commemoration was made after the resolution of 
the political crisis, but prior to the third round of the 
presidential elections, which brought the opposition 
candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, to power. The organiz-
ing committee for the celebrations consisted of mem-
bers of the Crimean government, and in January 2005 
its vice-premier, Professor Vladimir Kazarin, was busy 
making a last-minute pitch to raise the public profile of 
the event. In an interview with Kyiv's most respected 
weekly, Dzerkalo tyzhnia (Weekly Mirror), Kazarin sug-
gested that by starting late and not committing enough 
resources to the celebrations, Ukraine, a founding mem-
ber of the UN, was losing a chance to raise its visibility 
in world affairs and give a boost to its struggling tour-
ist industry. According to Kazarin, one of the problems 
encountered by the organizers of the commemoration 
was opposition to Tsereteli's monument to the Big Three.
37. See Viktor Sheinis, “Ten' vozhdia narodov,” Nezavisimaia 
gazeta, May 20, 2005.
Kazarin argued that it was a monument commemorat-
ing a particular event, not a tribute to Stalin. One could 
not remove important figures from history or pretend 
that certain events had never happened. Kazarin also 
noted that there were monuments to Genghis Khan and 
Tamerlane, which, in his opinion, was as it should be.38
As Kazarin sought to promote the commemoration 
of the Yalta Conference in the national media and argued 
in favor of installing Tsereteli's monument in Livadia, 
he found himself under increasing attack in the Crimea. 
The leaders of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis accused Kaza- 
rin—who, aside from being vice-premier of the Crimean 
government, was also a member of the Communist fac-
tion in the Crimean parliament and head of the Russian 
cultural society of the Crimea—of attempting to reha-
bilitate Stalin and Stalinism under the pretext of com-
memorating the Yalta Conference. They reminded the 
public that two years earlier the Communist deputies of 
the Sevastopol city council had voted in favor of building 
a monument to Stalin in their city. A leading figure in the 
Mejlis, Ilmi Umerov, stated that he could not accept the 
idea of a monument to the Big Three, given the forcible 
deportation of the Crimean Tatars conducted on Stalin's 
orders, as well as the controversial nature of the Yalta 
Conference, which had divided Europe into spheres of 
influence. The head of the Mejlis, Mustafa Dzhemilev, 
stated for his part that if such a monument were to be 
erected in Livadia, the Crimean Tatars would ensure that 
it would not stay there long. The appeal not to allow the 
installation of the monument was signed by dozens of 
former dissidents in Ukraine and Russia. The Crimean 
branches of Ukrainian political parties that supported 
the Orange Revolution made a similar appeal to Kyiv. 
As a result, the office of the Crimean attorney general 
annulled the decision of the Livadia town council to 
install the monument, citing a law that gave national 
authorities the right to make final decisions on the con-
struction of monuments of national significance. Kazarin 
had to retreat, announcing the postponement of a final 
decision, pending “public consultation” on the project.39
This was not the end of the controversy. On February 
4, 2005, the anniversary of the Yalta Conference, Com-
munists staged a meeting in Simferopol to protest the 
refusal of the Crimean authorities to install the monu-
ment. They criticized the Crimean premier, Serhii Kunit-
syn, for kowtowing to the new “Orange” government in 
Kyiv and threatened to initiate a criminal investigation 
into Kunitsyn's alleged embezzlement of parcels of land
38. See Mykola Semena, “U tsentri uvahy chy na zadvorkakh? 
Ukraina vtrachaie mizhnarodnyi prestyzh, zabuvaiuchy pro svoiu rol' 
u mizhnarodnii istorii',” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, January 15-22, 2005.
39. See “Ukraina i Vtoraia mirovaia voina,” Krymskoe obozrenie, 
February 1, 2005; “V Krymu otmechaiut 60-iu godovshchinu 
Ialtinskoi konferentsii,” Krymskoe obozrenie, February 6, 2005.
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on the Crimean shore of the Black Sea. The Crimean 
Tatars held their own rally in Livadia to protest the instal-
lation of the monument. On the eve of the commemo-
ration, Kazarin noted the irony that a bust of President 
Roosevelt was to be unveiled in Yalta, but that there 
would be no monument to the Big Three in Livadia. At 
the Livadia Palace, there was an exhibition featuring the 
offices occupied by Roosevelt and Churchill during the 
conference, but not Stalin's office. Eventually the orga-
nizers of the commemoration compromised, deciding to 
include Stalin's Livadia office in the exhibition instead 
of installing the monument to the Big Three. President 
Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia even promised to send 
artifacts from the Stalin museum in his native town of 
Gori. 40 But the controversy over the monument did not 
go away entirely. In April, Leonid Hrach, the leader of 
the Crimean Communists, called upon the Livadia town 
council to install Tsereteli's monument in order to honor 
the memory of those who had fallen for the “Great Vic-
tory.” The leaders of the Mejlis issued their own state-
ments on the matter, threatening to block the roads along 
which the monument could be transported to Livadia. By 
that time the decision not to allow the installation was 
final, forcing Tsereteli to look for a site in Russia, which 
led, in turn, to a major controversy in the Russian media.41
“Making Sense of War”
In 2002 Amir Weiner published his Making Sense 
of War, in which he discussed the impact of the Second 
World War on the elites and general population of Vin-
nytsia oblast in Ukraine during the postwar era.42 Judg-
ing by debates in the Ukrainian media, Ukrainians in 
the spring of 2005 were still struggling to make sense 
of their Second World War experience; hence the Yalta 
debate was not limited to Crimean political and histori-
cal discourse. Throughout 2005, articles in the Ukrainian 
press criticized the artificiality of Stalin's “constitutional 
reform” of 1944, which allowed the Soviet dictator to 
ask for an additional UN seat for the Ukrainian SSR. 
Such prominent Ukrainian historians as Yurii Shapoval 
attacked Stalin for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, ques-
tioning the dictator's role as “gatherer” of the Ukrainian 
lands.43 The Kyiv authors Serhii Hrabovsky and Ihor
Losiev, writing in the American Ukrainian-language 
newspaper Svoboda (Liberty), adopted the Polish-Bal-
tic position on Yalta.44 That position was shared by the 
majority in formerly Polish-ruled western Ukraine, 
which became part of the USSR as a result of the Molo-
tov-Ribbentrop Pact and the Yalta agreements. Eastern 
Ukraine, however, was not prepared to accept the “West-
erners'” interpretation of the history of the Second World 
War or of the decisions reached at Yalta. In the spring of 
2005, as the Ukrainian government struggled with the 
question of whether President Yushchenko should accept 
Vladimir Putin's invitation to the Moscow celebrations, 
the Ukrainian media kept its readers informed about the 
controversies provoked by the VE Day anniversary in 
Poland and the Baltic states. Polish articles debating the 
issue were published in translation in Ukrainian news-
papers, and statements of the Baltic leaders were liber-
ally quoted in articles by Ukrainian authors. Some of 
them, such as Viacheslav Anisimov, writing at the end 
of March in Dzerkalo tyzhnia, called upon Yushchenko 
not to fear displeasing the Kremlin, to decline Putin's 
invitation and celebrate the anniversary in Ukraine 
with his own people.45 After long hesitation, President 
Yushchenko opted for compromise: he flew to Moscow 
for a few hours, then rushed back to Kyiv on the same 
day to commemorate VE Day in the Ukrainian capital.
Prior to the VE Day celebrations in Moscow and 
Kyiv, public debate in Ukraine centered on the issue of 
whether the country had fought in the Great Patriotic 
War of the Soviet people or participated in the Second 
World War. The first interpretation meant sticking to 
the old Soviet myth of the war, which treated only Red 
Army soldiers as legitimate combatants and portrayed 
the cadres of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), 
who fought both the Soviets and the Nazis in western 
Ukraine, as German stooges. The second option allowed 
Ukrainian intellectuals to develop a Eurocentric or 
Ukrainocentric interpretation of the war, as opposed to 
a Russocentric one. Within that framework, Ukraine 
emerges as a country that fought against and was one 
of the major victims of both totalitarian systems of the 
twentieth century—fascism and communism.46 The 
choice of concept was not only important for the inter-
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pretation of history but also had serious political implica-
tions for the Ukrainian government and society at large.
At President Yushchenko's initiative, the new Ukrai-
nian government sought to do away with the Soviet-era 
tradition of commemorating Victory Day with a formal 
parade and attempted to use the occasion to encourage 
reconciliation between Red Army and UPA veterans, 
who had fought one another other during the war. Among 
other things, such a reconciliation was supposed to help 
bridge the gap between eastern and western Ukraine 
that had widened during the divisive presidential elec-
tions of 2004. Like many of the plans of Yushchenko's 
revolutionary government, the high hopes invested in 
the VE Day commemorations were disappointed. First, 
the Soviet Army veterans' organization protested chang-
ing the format of the celebrations. Then the idea of rec-
onciliation was opposed by the Communists and their 
allies in parliament, who protested the extension of gov-
ernment benefits enjoyed by combatants in the “Great 
Patriotic War” to UPA fighters. The government, try-
ing to avoid a new conflict between the two veterans' 
groups and their supporters, decided to abandon the idea 
of changing the traditional VE Day anniversary celebra-
tions. The Communists maintained their control over 
the Soviet veterans' association and preserved their de 
facto political monopoly on the commemorations.* 47 On 
October 15, 2005, when UPA supporters attempted to 
celebrate the sixty-third anniversary of the founding of 
the army with a demonstration in Kyiv, they were physi-
cally attacked by Communists and supporters of radical 
pro-Russian groups.48 Once again, worshippers of “the 
great Stalin” intervened to oppose Ukraine's attempt to 
break with the Soviet past. After the VE Day celebra-
tions Ukraine remained as divided as before in its atti-
tudes toward the Second World War and its outcome.
Conclusions
It has become a cliche to state that all politics are
local. It is more controversial to state that all histori-
cal debates are parochial, or are determined by local 
(national) agendas, traditions, fears and complexes. 
The recent Yalta debate, despite its international scope, 
seems to support the second proposition as much as the
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first. Remembering, forgetting and (re)interpreting the 
Yalta Conference during the winter and spring of 2005 
turned out to be a process fueled as much by national 
historiographic traditions as by current perceptions of 
national interests. Nevertheless, the recent Yalta debate 
allows one to draw some preliminary conclusions of a 
more general nature, as it sheds light on the interrela-
tion between historical memory and international poli-
tics in a dialogue involving great powers and smaller 
states dependent on their protection. One such conclu-
sion is that if the victims of Yalta stood united in their 
negative assessment of the Yalta accords, the victors' 
assessments of the agreements varied by political camp. 
It has been said that victors are not judged. The debates 
of 2005 in the United States and Russia show that they 
are judged, not only by others but also by themselves.
For the East Europeans, the anniversary was a 
chance to express their indignation about an event that 
had remained at the core of their historical memory and 
identity for the last sixty years. They could finally begin 
the process of healing their historical traumas by present-
ing a list of grievances to the main perpetrator, Russia, 
and its Yalta accomplices. It seems quite clear that for 
most of the Polish and Baltic elites, remembering Yalta 
was necessary not only to recover historical facts sup-
pressed by the Communist regimes, but also to ensure 
international recognition of the trauma suffered by the 
East European nations after the end of the Second World 
War. The first of these tasks was achieved immediately 
before and after the collapse of communism, with the 
consequent delegitimization of the Russocentric commu-
nist historical narrative. It was now time to achieve the 
second goal. By commemorating Yalta in 2005, the East 
European elites were once again parting ways with their 
nations' communist past and dependence on Russia—but 
they were now doing so on the international scene. As 
the countries of Eastern Europe were admitted to NATO 
and the European Union, it became safer for them to air 
their historical grievances against Moscow in the inter-
national arena. As the new Russia's activity in the region 
increased with the start of the new millennium, while a 
new generation of East European citizens who had never 
witnessed Communist or Soviet domination of their 
countries came of age, it also became useful, for domes-
tic and international reasons alike, to remind the world 
about the trauma of Yalta. As the East Europeans saw it, 
the new generation should not forget the lessons of the 
past, while the West should not repeat the errors of Yalta 
by allowing Russia a special role in Eastern Europe.
No country in the region was more interested in 
delivering this message to the world than Ukraine, which 
had just emerged from the drama of the Orange Revo-
lution, in which it had rejected Russian interference in 
its internal affairs. While the new Ukrainian government
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would have preferred to side with its Polish and Baltic 
colleagues in unreservedly condemning the Yalta agree-
ments, it had to acknowledge the lack of consensus on 
the significance of the Second World War within its own 
political elite. Remaining pro-Soviet sentiment in the 
country's eastern regions, as well as the still influential 
Communist opposition in parliament, drastically lim-
ited the new government's options with regard to pub-
lic remembrance of the end of the Second World War. 
The Ukrainian public debate on the legacy of the Yalta 
Conference was influenced not only by political dynam-
ics after the Orange Revolution but also by international 
considerations. None was more important than the issue 
of Ukraine's borders. While sharing the criticism of Yalta 
expressed by its western neighbors, the Ukrainian intel-
lectual elites could not fully condemn the conference that 
had made their country a founder of the United Nations 
and provided international legitimacy for its western 
borders. Thus, in the Ukrainian media the border ques-
tion was discussed in the context of the Molotov-Rib-
bentrop Pact, but not in that of the Yalta agreements. The 
sensitivity of the border issue helps explain Ukraine's 
reluctance to take advantage of the anniversary to raise 
its international profile: at Yalta the Big Three had made 
not only Poland but also Ukraine complicit in Stalin's 
division of Europe. As a result of the Yalta decisions, 
Ukraine obtained lands that did not belong to it before 
the war, although they were largely settled by eth-
nic Ukrainians. A new nation that could be considered 
both a beneficiary and a victim of Yalta, Ukraine, as 
represented by its government, preferred to “forget” so 
important an event in its history as the Yalta Conference.
What about the other beneficiaries of Yalta? No 
country seems more entrapped by the Yalta decisions 
and the legacy of Stalinism than the Russian Federa-
tion. Faced with actual and potential claims against its 
Yalta booty and post-Yalta policies on the part of Ger-
many, Japan, Poland, and the Baltic states, the Russian 
leadership is as far today as it has ever been from issu-
ing a public apology for the “crimes of Yalta.” Russian 
imperial pride is one reason President Bush's invitation 
to President Putin to apologize for the wrongs done to 
Russia's neighbors has elicited no positive response and 
will not do so in the immediate future. For the Russian 
elites, Yalta remains a symbol of their country's glory, 
reminding them of Moscow's former status as the capital 
of a superpower rivaled only by the United States. The 
nostalgic Communists continue to see the Yalta deci-
sions as proof of the triumph of communism and the 
greatness of the Communist dictator Joseph Stalin. Only 
the liberals, now weak and marginalized—an echo of the 
once powerful popular movement of the Gorbachev and 
early Yeltsin years—remain critical of both the Stalin-
ist legacy and Russia's continuing imperial ambitions.
All Russian political forces, from nationalists to lib-
erals, approached the Yalta and VE Day anniversaries 
with their own hopes and political agendas. The ruling 
elites wanted to raise and embellish Russia's interna-
tional image by reminding the world of its leading role 
in defeating fascism. The Russian conservatives com-
plained about the post-Cold War world, rife with unpre-
dictability and danger now that it was no longer held in 
check by Yalta-type agreements. In the eyes of Russian 
diplomats, the solution to the world's new insecurities 
was quite simple: it would suffice to recognize the ter-
ritories of the former Soviet Union as a zone of Russian 
responsibility. Russian liberals expected the collapse of 
the unjust Yalta arrangements to lead to the complete 
elimination of the Iron Curtain and make Russia a full 
member of the club of European nations. None of these 
scenarios materialized, and the negative reaction to the 
Moscow celebrations in East Central Europe dashed the 
hopes of Russian conservatives and liberals alike. This 
failure should not obscure the general trend in the evolu-
tion of Russian collective memory since the collapse of 
the USSR. As the loss of empire becomes more obvious 
to the Russian elites and society at large, and former cli-
ents adopt more independent policies toward Moscow, 
official Russia becomes less inclined to issue apologies 
for crimes and injustices perpetrated against the empire's 
former subjects. On the contrary, it becomes more aggres-
sive, both in the interpretation of its historical role in the 
region and in the pursuit of its current policies there.
Only the United States rose to the occasion when, 
in the words of its president, it condemned the Yalta 
agreements, placing them in the same category as the 
Munich appeasement and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. 
Unlike Russia, the United States is prepared to admit 
its historical error for the sake of building better rela-
tions with the countries of the region. President Bush's 
remarks about Yalta are an interesting case of the use 
and abuse of history on the international scene. There 
is little doubt that they were not intended mainly for a 
domestic audience. Bush appears to have had at least two 
goals in mind. The first was to support the countries of 
the new Europe that showed loyalty to the United States 
and embarrass President Putin, who was in no psycho-
logical, political or economic position to afford a similar 
admission of guilt. The second was to legitimize his war 
in Iraq and his policy in the Middle East by pledging 
never again to abandon support for freedom and democ- 
racy—the latter being the major theme of his discourse 
on Iraq. The president's use of the Yalta anniversary to 
recognize America's past errors, while promoting his 
new international agenda, did not sit well with critics of 
his administration in the U.S. Enraged by the compari-
son of the Yalta agreements to the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact (a mere recognition that, in the Baltic states at least,
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the Yalta decisions ratified the borders established by the 
Stalin-Hitler agreement of 1939), the Democrats rose 
instinctively to the defense of Franklin Delano Roos-
evelt, the Democratic president revered by all—even 
Ronald Reagan. The Yalta debate in the United States 
itself demonstrated once again the predominance of the 
national over the international perspective in the collec-
tive memory of the world's only remaining superpower.
Nevertheless, it would appear that the United States is 
winning not only the geopolitical competition with Rus-
sia in its East European backyard but also the historical 
debate. The ideas of freedom and democracy, which lie at 
the core of the master narrative of American history, are 
well suited to the requirements of past and present Ameri-
can policy in the region and find support and understand-
ing on the part of the East European “losers” of Yalta. 
As the tone of the Yalta debate in Poland demonstrates, 
the ideas of liberty and independence remain central 
elements of the Polish historical narrative and national 
self-image. They coexist with the tradition of depicting 
Poland as a quintessential victim of Russia and other 
world powers from the partitions of the Polish-Lithua-
nian Commonwealth in the second half of the eighteenth 
century to the end of the twentieth. In the East European 
countries discussed in this essay, only the Ukrainian elite 
ended up sitting on the fence, in complete accordance 
with the popular historiographic paradigm of Ukraine 
as a country positioned on the civilizational divide 
between East and West, democracy and authoritarianism.
In the case of Russia, its historical narrative lost its 
universal appeal with the collapse of communism. It 
is no longer possible to justify the Soviet takeover of 
Eastern Europe either by the interests of world com-
munism or by those of the toiling masses of the East 
European countries. The pan-Slavic idea, employed by 
Stalin during and immediately after the Second World 
War, has also lost its appeal. The idea of Russia's great- 
power status, which works at home, can only frighten 
the western neighbors of the new Russia. Thus, as was 
the case during the Yalta Conference, Moscow sought in 
2005 to find common ground with the West and its for-
mer republics and dependencies by appealing to Russia's 
role in the struggle against Nazi Germany and the lib-
eration of Eastern Europe from fascist rule. While the 
anti-Hitler theme clearly worked and apparently has a 
future, the “liberation” motif clearly backfired, since it 
opened Russia to attack by all those who were enslaved 
by communism after having been liberated from fas-
cism. The only way for Russia to change the dynamic 
of the historical debate would have been to offer sincere 
apologies to the victims of the Yalta agreements. Mos-
cow had missed one more chance to improve its image 
abroad and its relations with its western neighbors.
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